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Symposium:
The Disclosure Function
of the Patent System
Introduction
Sean B. Seymore*
A fundamental goal of the patent system is to encourage the
dissemination of technical knowledge.' The patent system achieves this
goal through a quid pro quo-in exchange for the right to exclude, the
inventor must fully disclose the technical details of the invention.2 As
soon as a patent document publishes, there is hope that the public will
use the technical details disclosed therein to improve upon the
invention, to design around it, or to engage in other innovative
activities.3 So while the patentee maintains the right to exclude others
* Professor of Law, Professor of Chemistry, and Chancellor Faculty Fellow, Vanderbilt
University.
1. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
2. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as "a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829)
(recognizing that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of the useful arts and to reward
inventors).
3. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that when the
information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the "general store of
knowledge" and assumedly will stimulate ideas and promote technological development); MICHAEL
A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD
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from practicing the invention until the patent expires, the technical
information disclosed in the patent document has potential immediate
value to the public.4 This supports the patent system's broader mission
to promote scientific progress and extend the frontiers of knowledge.5
The Supreme Court has stated that the patent system's ultimate
goal is to bring new ideas and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.6 In fact, the entirety of the patent system hinges
on disclosure.7 For example, requiring a full disclosure of how to make
and use the invention not only demonstrates that the inventor actually
possessed what is claimed in the patent, but also ensures that the public
will gain full possession of the invention once the patent expires.8
Achieving a robust disclosure from patent applicants is no easy
task because it brings to the fore competing goals of the patent system.
For example, the law must strike a balance between its interest in early
disclosure and the need to transform the patent into a substantive
technical document that can itself promote innovation.9 The law must
also strike a delicate balance between the public's interest in disclosure
and the inventor's incentive to disclose.10 A lax disclosure requirement
15-19 (2008) (explaining that disclosure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other
creative individuals can use and improve upon).
4. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624
(2010).
5. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 8; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 ("Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the
sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system .... "); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (observing that "the primary purpose of
our patent laws ... is to promote the progress of science and useful arts").
6. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
7. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1075 (2014)
(explaining how the statutory patentability requirements "work individually and collectively to
ensure that the public gets a meaningful disclosure").
8. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) ("The object is to put the public in
complete possession of the invention ... [so that] its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public,
after the patent expires."); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (explaining
that patent law "seeks to foster and reward invention" with the hope that the disclosure will
"stimulate further innovation and.., permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires").
9. Seymore, supra note 4, at 643 n.107; cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of
Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 1037 (2013) (articulating a proposal that "is designed to strike
a balance between an inventor's need to file early and a broader interest in using disclosure to
promote the patent system's overarching goal of scientific and technological progress").
10. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
143 (2002) (explaining that the quid pro quo rationale for patents is to incentivize the disclosure
of information that the public might not otherwise get).
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compromises the quid pro quo, meaning that the public might get
shortchanged in the so-called patent bargain.11 But a stringent
disclosure requirement might push some inventors toward trade
secrecy (i.e., no disclosure)-the antithesis of the patent system.
12
Despite its central role in the patent system, only recently have
scholars begun to seriously wrestle with the theoretical and doctrinal
aspects of the disclosure function. Hopefully, this Symposium issue will
stimulate future debate over and inquiry into this important issue in
patent law.
11. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV.
127, 143-54 (2008) (identifying problems with the current disclosure standard).
12. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 919 (2011); see also
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J.
1590, 1622 (2011) ("[T]rade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even more powerful
incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite in duration.").
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